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Abstract
Non-compliance is a well-known issue in the field
of cyber security. Non-compliance usually manifests
in an individual’s sins of omission or commission, and
it is easy to conclude that the problem is attributable
to their personal flawed decision making. However,
the individual’s decision not to comply is likely also
to be influenced by a range of environmental and
contextual factors. Bordieu, for example, suggests that
personal habitus influences decisions. We identified a
wide range of possible explanations for non-compliance
from the research literature and classified these, finding
that a number of the identified factors were indeed
habitus related. We then used Q-methodology to
determine which of these non-compliance explanations
aligned with public attributions of non-compliance
causatives. We discovered an “attribution gulf”, with
popular opinion attributing non-compliance primarily
to individual failings or ignorance. The existence of
this attribution gap means that those designing cyber
security interventions are likely to neglect the influence
of habitus on choices and decisions. We need to broaden
our focus if non-compliance is to be reduced.
1. Introduction
In the cybersecurity arena, people either comply with
organisational information security policies [1, 2], try
but struggle to comply [3] or actively resist [2, 4].
The latter, referred to as “non-compliance” in the cyber
security context, is the focus of this paper because,
as argued by Kirlappos et al., [5] “understanding
non-compliant behaviors provides the basis for effective
security.”
While the non-compliance phenomenon manifests
as an individual resisting policy strictures, there are
likely to be more complex reasons than individual
intransigence, ignorance or poor security skills [6, 7].
Utesheva and Boell [8] argue that we cannot study
the use of technology without giving due consideration
to the social context within which it emerges. They
argue for a more holistic approach. Sterne [9] cites
Elias and Jephcott [10], who argue that our behaviors
are socially informed, to their core, and that it is
impossible to understand human behavior from a purely
human cognition perspective. In this paper, we point
to the influence of Bordieu’s habitus in leading to
non-compliant behaviors in the cyber domain. We
also discovered that common wisdom in this area
primarily attributes non-compliance to the individual
user’s cognition, which impoverishes organizations’
ability to intervene successfully in this area. In this
paper, we ask: “what is the nature of society’s thinking
about cybersecurity non-compliance?”
We set the scene in Section 2, proposing an
extended habitus model to model the factors influencing
human cybersecurity behaviors. Section 3 explains
how we searched the literature review to identify
non-compliance factors, which we allocated to different
dimensions of the new “bigger picture” model. We
then carried out a study to gauge opinions related to
non-compliance causative attributions (Section 4). We
discuss our findings and conclude in Section 5.
2. Scoping the Bigger Picture
In understanding non-compliance, we consider two
dimensions. The first is that of the individual,
their knowledge, biases and decision-making strategies
(Section 2.1). We then introduce habitus (Section 2.2)
and justify the extension of the traditional habitus model
with cyber capital in Section 2.3.
2.1. Individual Issues
Non-compliance has been attributed to a range of
individual factors including dishonesty [11], a lack
of knowledge and awareness [5] and habit [12, 13,
14, 15], amongst others. While acknowledging the
validity of these factors, we also argue that focusing
on the individual, without giving due consideration
to the dynamism of social aspects, might contribute
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to the continuing intractability of the non-compliance
issue in organisations [16]. We plan to use Bordieu’s
concept of Habitus, extended to meet the needs of
the cyber era, to better understand all the factors that
influence employees and trigger non-compliance with
organizational cybersecurity policies.
2.2. Bordieu’s Habitus
Human behavior is likely to be influenced by a
concept suggested by Pierre Bordieu, called habitus
[17]. Bourdieu suggests that habitus is about the power
we have, with such power being a consequence of the
different kinds of capital we have accumulated over our
lifetimes.
Habitus is created as a consequence of the interplay
between free will and structures over time, the product
of ongoing processes of socialization [18]. These
processes impart practices which are accepted and
understood by society, but not necessarily encoded in
written format. Habitus emerges from lived experiences
and events and is also impacted by society’s structures
[19, p.170]. Habitus is created unconsciously, ‘without
any deliberate pursuit of coherence ... without any
conscious concentration [19, p.170]. Bordieu [17] calls
it a kind of second nature.
Papacharissi and Easton [18] explain that the habitus
concept is both ambiguous and flexible. However, rather
than this being a weakness of the theory, they argue that
these two characteristics give it the power to reflect how
humans respond to structural features of their world, and
that it does so by not separating structure from agency.
Bourdieu defines three forms of capital, which give
us power in society: social, cultural and economic.
Social capital refers to the network of ‘useful
relationships that can secure material or symbolic
profits’ [20, p.249] i.e. the number of people an
individual can draw upon.
Cultural capital has three forms:
Embodied: This is the capital which is part of the
person [20] i.e. within their bodies. It is accumulated
during childhood, based on experiences and advantages
accrued due to their relative position in society.
Objectified: This capital is related to the goods
and artefacts the person owns which communicate with
others [20]. The person might buy Apple products
because they have more prestige than the alternatives,
or display their well-populated bookshelf on Zoom calls
to signal their highbrow choices.
Institutionalised: This capital refers to the person’s
academic qualifications that make it possible for an
individual to convert between cultural and economic
capital. Bourdieu refers to this capital as ‘a certificate
of cultural competence which confers on its holder a
conventional, constant, legally guaranteed value with
respect to culture’ [20, p. 248]. So, someone with
an Oxford degree would have higher institutionalised
capital than a person with a degree from a post-1992
University in the UK.
Economic capital is related to the person’s financial
wealth, and is clearly connected to the careers we choose
and the jobs we engage in, which all contribute to the
accumulation of such wealth. Inherited wealth also falls
into this category.
2.3. Extending Habitus
It could be argued that Bordieu’s cultural capital is
flexible enough to encompass modern day technology
usage and cyber security rituals. This would align
with Davies and Rizk’s [21] narrative on how cultural
capital has expanded and flexed to be useful within the
educational domain. However, a number of researchers
have argued for the existence of a technological capital
to be included in the habitus model [22, 23].
The cyber field is indeed closely linked to the
technological field. Yet, Bell [24] explains that the
cyber world is different from the physical world. It not
only makes use of technology, it also allows people to
carve out their own identities, and to craft home pages
that convey the image they want to convey. Moreover,
the cyber field includes the concept of cyber criminals,
something that the technological field does not grapple
with. Technological capital thus does not appear to play
a role in terms of non-compliance.
In the cybersecurity field, the distinctions between
those with cybersecurity knowledge, and those without,
is stark [25, 26]. Shia [27] highlights the digital
cybersecurity divide in the global south, with the gap
between the haves and have-nots being particularly
visible and deleterious. Debb et al. [28] raises the
age-related differences in online security behaviors.
These are the kinds of factors that manifest in the
differences in other kinds of habitus capital areas, which
suggests that this kind of capital endows people with
new modern kind of socially-imbued power. There is
also a worldwide need for cybersecurity experts [29],
once again suggesting that cyber capital is particularly
valuable.
We thus conclude that it would be useful, for
the purposes of our investigation, to consider cyber
capital as a distinct kind of capital. Similar to [25,
22], we argue that separating this capital from others
gives us the ability to examine non-compliance with
information security policies related to the use of
workplace technologies, and in identifying barriers to
Page 4558
compliance.
3. Methodology
To find out what the general public attributes
non-compliance to, we first determine what factors the
research literature refers to in this respect, and classify
these in terms of the habitus capital types (Section 3.1).
We then explain the Q-methodology mechanism, which
we used to gauge subjectivity i.e. general attributions
of non-compliance (Section 3.2). Finally, Section 3.3
explains how we recruited and remunerated our study
participants.
3.1. Deriving Non-compliance Factors
There is an extensive literature into compliance
in the information security domain, as reflected by
a number of systematic literature reviews [30, 31,
32]. However, compliance and non-compliance are
not always opposite sides of the same coin. Similar
to acceptance and resistance factors [33], the factors
that motivate compliance and those that lead to
non-compliance can be different from each other
[34]. Hence, in carrying out this review, we only
searched for papers related to “information security”
and “noncompliance or non-compliance.” We then
proceeded as follows:
Deriving: We worked through the papers to extract
all non-compliance factors researchers cited. We then
derived statements which we could use in our Q-sort
procedure. We did this independently then met to refine
and agree on final statements.
Consolidating: The authors worked through the list
together to combine semantically similar factors and
then translated these to statements which we could use in
confirming public perceptions of the influence of these
factors in leading to non-compliance (Table 1).
Categorizing: We then classified the factors as
either within the individual or one of the other four
habitus capital types in our extended model (Figure 1).
3.2. Assessing Subjectivity
To assess perceptions of the identified factors’
influence, we used Q-methodology, a research method
introduced by Stephenson [72] for the systematic
study of subjectivity. Q-methodology is essentially
an informal instantiation of Cultural Consensus Theory
[73], which provides a framework for the measurement
of beliefs as cultural phenomena. In other words,
it allows us to assess beliefs shared by groups of
individuals. As such, this theory helps us to assess what
people consider to be the culturally appropriate answers
INDIVIDUAL
SOCIAL CAPITAL CYBER CAPITAL
ECONOMIC CAPITAL CULTURAL CAPITAL
HABITUS
6, 9, 11
2, 3, 4, 5, 10, 12, 
21, 24
1 , 7, 15, 18, 16, 25 
13, 20, 22, 23 
8, 14, 17, 19, 26 
Figure 1. Mapping Factors to Habitus Capital Types
& Individual Attributes (Numbers refer to Factors in
Table 1)
to a series of related questions (the overriding theme, in
our case, being cybersecurity non-compliance).
The findings are not meant to be representative of
the general population, but rather to reveal the nature
of subjectivity in this domain. Not ‘how are people
thinking on the topic?’, but rather: ‘what is the nature
of their thinking?’ This focus on segments of similar
or dissimilar points of view renders the issue of large
participant numbers ‘relatively unimportant’ [74].
The method essentially seeks to reveal correlations
between subjects across a sample of variables, referred
to as the Q set and which is composed of Q statements.
Factor analysis isolates the most influential “factors,”
which represent cultural ways of thinking. The method’s
strengths are that it applies sophisticated factor analysis,
but also supports a qualitative analysis by eliciting
responses which explain people’s ranking of different
statements. It is an exploratory technique which cannot
prove hypotheses, but can provide a coherent view on
‘potentially complex and socially contested’ issues [75].
Figure 2 details the steps participants engage in when
doing a Q-sort.
Welcome
Agree/
Disagree/
Neutral
Q Sort
Statements
Confirm Free Text
Responses
Thanks
1. 5.4.3.2. 6.
Figure 2. Q-Sorting Process
Participants sort the statements into a fixed
quasi-normal distribution, ranging from -3 (disagree)
to +3 (agree). Participants were given a chance to
amend and confirm their rankings and then asked for
open-ended comments for the most agreeable (ranked
+3) and most disagreeable (ranked -3) statements. This
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Table 1. Grouped Non-compliance Factors & Corresponding Q Statements
# Factor Source(s) Q Statement Capital
1 Neutralization strategies [35, 36, 37] People are satisfied that they can justify why
they don’t need to follow the rules.
Cultural
2 Perceived cost of
non-compliance; Sanction
likelihood; Sanction
severity
[37, 35, 38, 39,
40, 41, 42]
There is little chance of being called out for not
following the rules.
Economic
3 Perceived cost of
compliance; Work
Impediment; Perceived
response cost
[37, 43, 5, 44,
45, 46, 13, 47]
It is just too troublesome to follow the rules. Economic
4 Unrealistic task demands;
Difficulty
[3, 37, 43, 5,
44, 45, 46, 13]
Cyber security gets in the way of doing their
jobs.
Economic
5 Lack of sanctions;
Incomplete monitoring
[38, 39] There are few consequences for not following
the rules.
Economic
6 Mistrust; Rules
oriented environment;
Strict IT governance;
Rules-oriented ethical
climate
[48, 49, 36, 11,
49, 11, 44, 50,
47, 51]
An unpleasant workplace environment. Social
7 National culture [52, 53, 48, 39] Behavior is influenced by national culture. Cultural
8 Anxiety; Fear;
Information security
stress; Negative affective
flow
[43, 3, 54, 12,
55, 47]
People feel generally anxious, stressed, or
fearful.
Individual
9 Behaviors of peers;
Susceptibility to
interpersonal influence;
Social norms; Differential
association
[43, 56, 57, 53,
58, 3, 57, 42,
42]
People are copying the behavior of their
colleagues.
Social
10 Workload [3, 54] People are overloaded with work. Economic
11 Being excluded from
policy formulation
[3] People are not allowed to feed into the creation
of cyber security rules.
Social
12 Lack of resources [3, 53, 48] People lack physical resources (e.g. technology,
money) to follow the rules.
Economic
13 Intuitive, overriding, and
declarative cognitions;
Lack of awareness
[59, 5, 47, 60,
60]
People lack knowledge and awareness of cyber
security.
Cyber
14 Dishonesty [11] Dishonest people don’t follow rules. Individual
15 Shadow security
(workarounds)
[5, 60, 61] People find convenient alternatives to cyber
security requirements.
Cultural
16 Rules are impossible to
follow
[5, 3, 62, 60, 7] It’s too difficult, or impossible, to follow the
rules.
Cultural
17 Values [63, 64, 58] The rules do not align with personal values. Individual
18 Invasion of privacy [54] Following the rules violates personal privacy. Cultural
19 Habit [12, 13, 14, 15] People prefer to do what they are used to doing. Individual
20 Frustration [55] People feel frustrated with cyber security
requirements.
Cyber
21 Perceived benefits of
non-compliance
[65] People believe there are benefits in NOT
following the rules.
Economic
22 High over-confidence [66] People consider themselves too smart and
therefore above the rules.
Cyber
23 Complacency; Loafing [62, 67, 60] People are not interested in cyber security. Cyber
24 Rewards; Commitment [13, 42] People are not committed to cyber security, and
only follow rules because of external rewards.
Economic
25 Poor business-IT
alignment; Perceived
policy argument
[68, 60] People don’t agree with the rationale behind the
rules.
Cultural
26 Compliance Budget [69, 70, 71] People comply up to a point, and then they’re
done.
Individual
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serves to get ‘an impression of the range of opinion at
issue’ [74].
3.3. Piloting, Recruitment & Remuneration
Five pilot tests were undertaken and timed, to
get a sense for the time needed for the task.
Based on feedback obtained from the pilot testers,
unclear statements were subsequently refined and clarity
improved.
Forty participants were recruited on the Prolific
platform (https://www.prolific.co/). This is
consistent with recommended participant group sizes
in Q-methodology [75]. Based on the pilot study
timings, we paid participants £3 for 20 minutes of
labour, exceeding the UK minimum wage. Ethical
approval was obtained from our ethical review board.
Participants did not provide any personal data, ensuring
that participation was anonymous.
4. Analysis & Findings
We extracted factors using the centroid technique
and applied a varimax procedure for factor rotation.
Factors with an eigenvalue in excess of 1.00, and having
at least two significantly loading participants, were
selected for interpretation (as recommended in [75]).
The composite Q-sort for each factor is included in
Appendix A. In this section, Pi refers to a comment by
Participant i.
Factor A: People are focused on themselves and
driven by habit (Figure 3).
Demographic information: Factor A has nine
significantly loading participants (5M/4F) with an
average age of 31.78 years. It explains 14% of the study
variance with an eigenvalue of 9.48.
Factor interpretation: One of the strongest opinions
here is that non-compliance is due to dishonesty (14:
+3). As P3 said: “Dishonest people care less about
boundaries in place, so they are more likely to do what
they want and not what is best for everyone.” P22 said
“Some people are only interested in personal benefit
irregardless of regulations, or if they are negatively
affecting someone else.” The influence of habit (19:
+3) is important, as “... people will often automatically
do whatever it is they are most used to doing and it
is often either difficult or worrying to change behavior.
Sometimes I think people don’t even realise that they’re
doing something that could be improved.” (P3).
Behavior is also influenced by national culture (7:
+2) and the “media and television” (P25). It’s not
troublesome, too difficult, or impossible to follow the
rules (16: -3; 3: -2), as P13 explains “... it’s all
about self-commitment and often people just don’t want
to make the effort.” P20 agreed that “I don’t think
there is any difficulty in following any kind of rule as
long as the rule doesn’t involve disclosing personal
data for malicious reasons.” People are not finding
alternative workarounds to cyber security requirements
(15: -3). P19 stated: “unfortunately, I think there are
no convenient alternatives to cyber security, especially
in modern workspaces.” People are interested in cyber
security up to a point (23: -2; 26: +1), for example
“... people will get security apps on their devices and
assume that they are fine from there ...” (P3). P34 stated:
“I think with the modern technology we have and use
every day, it’s hard not to want to protect yourself ...
[people] comply to a point where [they] think they’re
safe.” People may lack knowledge and awareness of
cybersecurity (13: +2) and because they are overloaded
with work (10: +2) people “do not have the time to think
about cyber security” (P35).
Factor B: People don’t like change and are
not sufficiently informed to comply. (Figure
4). Demographic information: Factor B has six
significantly loading participants (1M/5F) with an
average age of 33 years. It explains 12% of the study
variance with an eigenvalue of 3.29.
Factor interpretation: People prefer to do what they
are used to doing (19: +3) and “don’t like changes
in their routine or in the way they always do things”
(P38). As P12 states: “humans are creatures of habits
[sic].” People will comply up to a point (26: +2) but
“[generally] resent being told what to do. They are
prepared to follow rules to an extent, but if those rules
begin to inconvenience them they will stop complying
with them.” (P18). Instead of it being difficult to follow
the rules (16: -2) it’s “more the question of not wanting
to” (P38) and people considering themselves above the
rules (22: +2). As P39 explains: “There are always
people in workplaces who deem themselves above the
rules and don’t think rules apply to them. Not just
cyber rules but all rules!” These participants strongly
disagreed with the notion that cyber security gets in the
way of people doing their jobs (4: -3). P37 says “It
ensures security for the user and that’s what matters
most.” People don’t have sufficient knowledge and
awareness of cyber security (13: +3) and “computers,
the internet and how to be safe online” (P12). People are
not interested in cyber security (23: -1) and “unless [you
are] technically minded, cyber security is boring” (P18).
Considering neutralisation techniques (1: -1) there “isn’t
any valid justification for not following the rules. Rules
are in place for a reason.” (P18).
Factor C: People comply up to a point and
then look for workarounds (Figure 5). Demographic
information: Factor C has three significantly loading
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participants (2M/1F) with an average age of 38.33 years.
It explains 8% of the study variance with an eigenvalue
of 2.82. Factor interpretation: People comply up to a
point (26: +3) but “do not want security as an extra
work, or we just don’t perceive it as an important
problem” (P28). P27 further elaborates that “Sometimes
cyber securities rules or restrictions are just too much.
At that point you start looking for workarounds. For
instance, now that I work from home mostly, I get
frustrated with all the extra rules and the performance
issues it causes. So, if I want to work comfortably at
something I email it to my personal email address and
work at it on my home pc.” Compliance is “something
we take from our environment” (P16) and influenced by
national culture (7: +3). People also copy the behavior
of colleagues (9: +2) as “sometimes people don’t really
have their own opinion so they attach themselves to
someone else’s” (P16). People have “... modern
technology. Everyone can see consequences of not
following the rules. It’s their choice not to follow them”
(P16) and lack of physical resources is not the issue (12:
-2). People have sufficient knowledge and awareness
(13: -3), and agree with the rationale (25: -3). P27
commented “I think people have been bombarded with
information on cybersecurity. Especially in a corporate
environment. Most people know enough. But it is as with
eating and exercising. You know what is good for you,
but how many people choose to do the exact opposite?”
Cyber security does not align well with personal values
(17: +1) and “the user is an afterthought. That is what
frustrates people. The want the rule makers to be aware
of what they want and need, and them to come up with a
solution that allows them to behave as they want and be
safe at the same time” (P27).
Factor D has both positive and negative significant
loadings and is thus a bipolar factor. It has an overall
eigenvalue of 2.73. It has been split to produce two
distinct factor interpretations [75], described as D1 and
D2 below.
Factor D1: People think they know better
and are influenced by colleagues in justifying
non-compliance (Figure 6). Demographic information:
Factor D has four significantly loading participants (4M)
with an average age of 29 years. It explains 9% of the
study variance with an eigenvalue of 2.72.
Factor interpretation: Participants strongly agreed
that people considered themselves too smart to follow
the rules (22: +3). P8 said: “People have huge ego’s
but don’t know much about IT at all so they will call
you asking for help and then when you tell them they
will say they know better.” behavior is influenced by
national culture (7: +2) as “it is the environment that
we are brought up in that influences us the most” (P31).
People copy the behavior of their colleagues (9: +3).
There is a perception that people can “justify why the
rules don’t apply to them” (P4) and thus don’t follow
the rules (1: +2). However, people can expect “a good
chance that we will answer for our deeds” as P31 states
(2: -3). Following the rules does not violate personal
privacy (18: -2) as “cyber security rules are used to
maintain privacy” (P26).
Factor D2: People are not interested in cyber
security, but are driven by external rewards (Figure
7). Demographic information: Factor E has two
significantly loading participants (2M) with an average
age of 22.5 years. It explains 9% of the study variance
with an eigenvalue of 1.92.
Factor interpretation: These participants do not
agree that people will try to justify why they do not need
to follow the rules (1: -3), nor do they believe that people
do not face consequences for non-compliance (5: -2) or
that people comply up to a point and then give up (26:
-1). P32 says: “I believe that everyone person knows or
at least has the thought the karma may hit them if they
don’t follow the rules properly.”
They do, on the other hand, consider that people
are not interested in cyber security (23: +3), are not
committed to cyber security (24: +3), and that following
the rules would violate their personal privacy (18: +2).
P32 said “I know a lot of people who did cyber security
and ended up dropping the coarse they lost interest
and become dishonest with themselves, and realising
over time they only did it for the external rewards
but soon realised it wasn’t what they where passionate
about, then eventually dropped the course has a whole.”
Following the rules violates personal privacy (18: +2)
and there is a feeling that the rules do not align with
personal values (17: -3) because “the rules are made by
giant corporations and therefore do not respect personal
values” (P1).
Factor E: People comply up to a point, but
lack knowledge and become frustrated (Figure
8). Demographic information: Factor E has six
significantly loading participants (6F) with an average
age of 41.33 years. It explains 7% of the study variance
with an eigenvalue of 1.92.
Factor interpretation: These participants do not
believe that people are affected by the behaviors of their
peers (9: -3). P21 says “How people work online is a
personal thing, so I don’t think someones actions would
necessarily be influenced by someone else.” People will
comply up to a point, but feel frustrated with cyber
security requirements (26: +3; 20: +3). They lack
knowledge and awareness of cyber security (13: +2).
As P23 explains, “lack of knowledge about the topic
means terminology can be confusing which for lots of
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users means they stop paying attention and ignore things
which could be problems.” P21 illustrates the lack of
understanding by stating: “People don’t fully understand
the why cyber security measures are in place and the
implications if it wasn’t. Until someone is personally
affected by it, it’s always something that happens to
other people.” A further issue is that people lack
physical resources to follow the rules (12: +1). On
the other hand, they do believe that people lack the
resources to follow the rules (12: +1). P23 says: “Often
good quality security add ons can be expensive and if
people don’t know what they are all about they wont
pay for something if they are not sure why they need
it!” A problematic combination is a lack of knowledge
and cost, as P23 explains, “often good quality security
add-ons can be expensive and if people don’t know
what they are all about they won’t pay for something
if they are not sure why they need it!” The behavior
of colleagues is not a big factor in non-compliance (9:
-3) as “how people work online is a personal thing,
so I don’t think someone’s actions would necessarily
be influenced by someone else” (P21). Violation of
personal privacy is not an issue, as “... these measures
are in place to protect it” (P21).
5. Discussion & Conclusion
The six factors we uncovered overwhelmingly
attribute non-compliance to individuals, their
cognitions, knowledge, habits and frustrations. Only
one mentions the fact that people are influenced by
the behaviors of their peers (social capital), a powerful
influence [76, 77] that should be given far more
acknowledgement. Moreover, there is little mention of
the other habitus capital factors which were revealed by
our research literature review. Our participants did not
agree that cultural or economic capital types influenced
cyber security behaviors.
Our study thus reveals an attribution gulf. While
researchers have highlighted the influence of a range
of non-compliance causatives, many of which align
with habitus concepts, the general public still attributes
non-compliance to individual users’ deliberate and
flawed behaviors.
Why is this a problem? Because the situation is
far more complex and non-compliance reasons do not
arise purely from the minds and hearts of individual
users without any reference to their context and standing
within their communities. If we attribute the problem
to individuals, our interventions will also focus on
individuals, and non-compliance will not be reduced in
any meaningful way.
It should be emphasized that this analysis reveals
opinions i.e. how people see things. While the
relatively small number of participants (40) would
be too small to demonstrate statistical significance, it
is methodologically appropriate for detecting cultural
opinions [75], which is what we aimed to achieve.
We ought to design interventions to reduce
non-compliance by acknowledging the habitus-related
factors. So, for example, if we address the intervention
towards the entire team who work and collaborate, to
develop a social compliance norm, we have a much
better chance of succeeding. We also have to be very
careful not to reduce status in front of peers, because
that is likely to have the opposite effect.
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